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RUNNABLE, RUINABLE REPO AND THE GREAT
RECESSION: A PANIC-PROOFING APPROACH TO
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Aaron Metviner *
We want a system that is not prone to panics, or, better yet, a system
that does not have panics, a system where losing confidence does not
happen . . . In the aftermath of the [2008 financial crisis], how can
such a system be designed?
—Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand (2010)

INTRODUCTION
“The [2008 financial] crisis,” then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke reflected at a 2012 conference on financial regulation, “is best
understood as a classic financial panic.” 1 A “panic” occurs when short-term
debt claimants decide en masse to no longer fund the banking system. 2 Yale
economist Gary Gorton has shown that “the most important part of the panic
occurred in the repo market.” 3 “Run on repos,” he holds, “[was] the core
problem in the financial crisis.” 4
“Repo” is shorthand for “sale and repurchase agreement.” Institutional
financiers—like money market mutual funds, pension funds, and corporate
treasuries—enter into these short-term (typically overnight) “repo agreements”
with Wall Street firms. Repo provides them with a sort of demand deposit

*
Aaron Metviner received his JD/MBA in finance from Emory University, where he received the
Dean’s Award in Banking Law. He will join the New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
as a financial restructuring associate in 2018. He would like to thank professors James Elliott and Paul Zwier
for their guidance on this paper.
1
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Comm’n, Remarks at the Russell Sage Foundation and the
Century Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance: Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy
Response (April 13, 2012).
2
MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM 108 (2016) (“[A] panic is a situation in which ‘holders of
short-term liabilities . . . [refuse] to fund banks.’”).
3
GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 133 (2010). Also Laurence
Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers 7 (July 14, 2016) (paper prepared for meeting of the NBER Monetary
Economics Program) (“The fatal part of this cycle was a liquidity crisis . . . the most important problem
[involving] repurchase agreements, or repos.”). Id. at 111 (“The largest liquidity drain [on Wall Street banks in
2007/2008] . . . was a loss of repo financing.”).
4
Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brookings Paper on
Economic Activity, October 18, 2010, at 279.
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account for their excess cash. 5 It also gives Wall Street firms access to an
enormous amount of cash. The “run on repo” was a run by major financial
institutions (the repo lenders) on other major financial institutions (the repo
borrowers).
Demand deposit accounts and overnight repo agreements serve a similar
function for retail depositors and repo “depositors” respectively. Large
financial institutions, not unlike regular people, want to earn interest on their
excess cash while not losing the ability to access their cash at any time. That is
why they enter into these overnight repo agreements with Wall Street banks.
Each day, they can either “withdraw” their cash or “roll over” their repo. If
they choose the former, the repo borrower—under the terms of the repo
agreement—must obviously honor that demand.
The key practical difference between demand deposits and overnight repo
“deposits” is that the federal government provides deposit insurance for the
former but not the latter. 6 To lessen the repo lenders’ counterparty default risk
(i.e., that the Wall Street bank won’t have the cash on hand to honor the repo
lender’s “withdrawal”), repo deposits are collateralized. Repo lenders are fully
secured creditors of their counterparty banks, contractually armed with
immediate recourse to the specified collateral under each repo agreement if
their counterparty bank defaults.
One of the key lessons to be drawn from the 2008 financial crisis is that
this security interest was not enough of a security interest to offset the repo
lenders’ counterparty default risk. In other words, having immediate recourse
to collateral—even high-quality collateral—was inadequate to temper the
concerns of skittish repo lenders and contain the contagious run on repo. 7
Vanderbilt law professor and former Treasury bureaucrat Morgan Ricks has
made this point loud and clear, most recently in his 2016 book The Money
Problem.
Gary Gorton and Morgan Ricks are two of academia’s main proponents of
the “panic-proofing” approach to financial regulation. That approach, on which

5
Id., at 276 (“Entities [such as institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds, states and
municipalities, and nonfinancial firms] . . . would like to have a safe investment that earns interest, while
retaining flexibility to use the cash when needed—in short, a demand deposit-like product.”).
6
The FDIC backstops retail deposits at insured banks up to $250 thousand (prior to the financial crisis,
$100 thousand).
7
See BEN BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 397
(discussing “the paralyzing uncertainty [on the part of repo lenders] about banks’ financial health in 2007 and
2008).
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this paper ideologically stands, is based on the following logical progression
and understanding of US banking history:
1 – US banking history was marked by frequent financial panics 8 (and in
turn macroeconomic tragedies) until the Depression-era advent of deposit
insurance in 1934. Deposit insurance is to thank for the 75-year “Quiet
Period”—of no systemic panics from the Depression to the Recession—in US
banking history. 9
2 – A panic by institutional financiers, mainly overnight repo creditors on
systemic financial institutions, 10 commenced in August 2007. 11 This panic
reached its acute phase in September 2008, when twelve out of America’s 13
leading financial institutions faced dire threats to their survival. 12 If not for this
panic, the Great Recession would have been far less severe and might not have
happened. 13
3 – Systemically important financial institutions (the “SIFIs,” mostly Wall
Street banks 14) continue to rely heavily on runnable short-term debt to finance
their long-term activities. Thus, “panics represent far and away the biggest
threat that the financial system poses to the broader economy.” 15 The focus of
financial regulation should therefore be on “panic-proofing.” 16

8
Id. at 108 (“Gorton uses “panic” the same way I use it here: a panic is a situation in which ‘holders of
short-term liabilities . . . [refuse] to fund banks.’”).
9
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 64 (“Periodic banking panics
have been the norm in U.S. history. But the panics appeared to end in the U.S. when deposit insurance was
legislated in 1934.”).
10
Id. at 54 and 58 (“The run occurred in the repo market . . . depositors” were firms that lent money in
the repo market.”). See also GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE
THEM COMING 190 (“The banking system on repo became very large prior to the crisis.”).
11
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 23 (“The current crisis is a
banking panic.”).
12
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L. COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN.
AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 354 (January 2011).
13
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 183 (“The deterioration of house prices and
defaults in the subprime mortgage market were not enough to cause a systemic crisis by themselves.”).
14
See BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT, at 395 (“We focused on the nineteen largest U.S.-owned
bank holding companies, those with assets of $100 billion or more. Collectively, they hold about two-thirds of
the assets and half the loans in the U.S. banking system.”).
15
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 24.
16
Id. at 122 (“[There is a] strong case that panics should be viewed as the central problem for financial
stability policy.”); Id. at 3 (“Panic-proofing, as opposed to, say, asset bubble prevention or “systemic risk”
mitigation, should be the central objective of financial stability policy.”). See also GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE
INVISIBLE HAND, at 183 (“We want a system that is not prone to panics, or, better yet, a system that does not
have panics, a system where losing confidence does not happen . . . In the aftermath of the [Great Recession],
how can such a system be designed?”).
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Ricks and Gorton agree that the focus of financial regulation should be on
panic-proofing. They have different ideas, however, on how policymakers
should go about panic-proofing the financial system. Gorton would reform the
repo market by ensuring the high quality of repo collateral. Ricks would
federally insure all the short-term debt obligations of systemically important
commercial banks. And both would limit the exposure levels of the SIFIs to
runnable short-term debt.
This paper argues for a sort of Gorton/Ricks hybrid approach to panicproofing, whereby the federal government (1) insures the very-short-term repo
obligations of the SIFIs (while also ensuring the high-quality of the collateral
under those repo agreements) and (2) limits the exposure levels of the SIFIs to
all other forms of uninsured runnable debt.
Section I will discuss the historical panic-proofing success of deposit
insurance in the US. It will explain how deposit insurance became an
anachronistic solution to forestalling panics, given the rise of the money
markets and the institutional “depositor.” It will then cover the repo market,
the run on repo of 2007 and 2008, and why repo lenders ran en masse from the
SIFIs in the prelude to the Recession.
Section II will examine the two main pieces of financial legislation to
emerge from the Great Recession, the domestic law Dodd-Frank and the
international accord Basel III. It will specifically ask what these laws do to
contain panics by repo lenders, as well as discuss their general “riskconstraint” (not panic-proofing) approach to financial regulation.
Section III will expand upon the panic-proofing models for financial
regulation as proposed by Ricks and Gorton. It will critique these models
before offering this paper’s original panic-proofing approach.
I.

RUNNABLE, RUINABLE REPO AND THE GREAT RECESSION

A. Banking’s Inherent Susceptibility to Panics
The classic business model of banking involves a heavy reliance on shortterm debt to finance long-term assets. 17 This almost has to be the case, since

17
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 52 (“[B]anking inevitably involves [borrowing
short to finance long assets] because part of making the “deposit” nearly riskless is for it to be short maturity.
Note that with insured deposits, the debt is effectively long maturity because depositors have no need to run
their banks to try to withdraw cash.”).
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“part of making the “deposit” nearly riskless is for it to be short maturity.” 18
But this makes banks “inherently susceptible to a liquidity crisis or “run” in
which short-term claimants simultaneously seek to redeem.” 19
Prior to the Depression-era establishment of deposit insurance in 1934,
American banking was marked by regular panics and macroeconomic storms.
Concerned their banks could fail, retail depositors rushed to withdraw their
funds. Failure to withdraw in time could mean becoming an unsecured creditor
of a failed bank in a bankruptcy proceeding—and perhaps having to wait years
before receiving any money back.
B. Establishment of the FDIC and the “Quiet Period” in US Banking
The tragedy of the Great Depression, triggered by a widespread panic by
retail depositors, prompted the US Congress to establish federal deposit
insurance in 1934. A new federal agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), would now insure all bank deposits at insured member
banks up to a certain dollar amount (today $250 thousand).
Retail depositors could now rest assured that, if their bank were to fail, the
FDIC would promptly send them a check covering the full amount of their
deposit balance. They now had no reason to withdraw their funds from their
banks in a frenzy anymore—their deposits were backed by the full faith and
credit of the US Treasury.
The advent of deposit insurance set the stage for the 75-year “Quiet
Period” in American banking—a period marked by no systemic panics. 20
Deposit insurance “stopped the cycle of runs on demand deposits and allowed
them to be used safely as money,” 21 creating an “unusually stable time for the
US economy.” 22
C. Rise of the Institutional “Depositor” and Unraveling of the Quiet Period
The Quiet Period began to unravel in the 1980s. Wall Street firms,
historically reliant on retail deposits for their cash needs, began to rely
18

Id.
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 4. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 22
(commenting on the nature of Wall Street banks’ short-term funding in the lead-up to the Crisis: “Some of this
funding was unsecured commercial paper, but a much larger part was repurchase agreements, or ‘repos.’”).
20
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 61 (“[T]here was no systemic event in banking
[from the Great Depression] until 2007.”).
21
See Gorton & Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, at 268.
22
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 108.
19
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increasingly on institutional money—that of money market funds, pension
funds, and other large financial institutions. There had been an “explosion of
the modern day money markets,” 23 and these financiers needed a safe place to
store their excess cash in the short-term. 24 Repo provided that place. Retail
deposits, in turn, diminished in importance as a financing vehicle for Wall
Street firms.
By 2007, a run by these institutional repo creditors would be capable of
leading to large-scale liquidity problems on Wall Street. On Wall Street’s
collective pre-Recession balance sheet, liabilities for repo debt far exceeded
the banks’ readily available liquidity. 25 And repo deposits were not FDICinsured (they well exceeded $250 thousand in value). Gorton states the obvious
point: “Deposit insurance works well for retail investors but leaves a challenge
for institutions with large cash holdings.” 26 FDIC insurance no longer served a
panic-proofing purpose. 27
Commencing in August 2007—and culminating in September 2008
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers—an en masse run by repo creditors
on their Wall Street counterparties brought the Quiet Period to a harsh close.
D. Repo
The “repo agreement” 28 would overtime become an increasingly important
vehicle of short-term debt financing for Wall Street firms. By the time of the
Crisis, repo had become “the most important form of short-term finance in
modern financial markets.” 29 Gorton estimates the size of the “important” and
“immense” repo market to have been “somewhere around $10 trillion” in
2008, roughly the same size as the total assets of the entire regulated U.S.

23

See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 20.
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 55.
25
See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 81, describing how the amount of collateral pledged in
repo agreements greatly exceeded Wall Street banks’ liquidity pools. Using Lehman as an example:
“[Lehman’s] liquidity pool could absorb some loss of repo funding, but not too much.”
26
See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 261, 263 (Fall 2010).
27
See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences,
Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 31 (New York Univ. Stern Schl. of Business, Working Paper 2011):
“In the crisis of 2007–2009, when we faced wholesale depositor runs, the Federal Reserve had to pull out all
stops—given the lack of FDIC coverage of such deposits—to effectively suspend the runs” (emphasis added).
28
“Repo agreement” is short for “sale and repurchase agreement.”
29
See MILNE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF CREDIT, at 32. See also Hordahl and King, at 39: “The
(former) top US investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo markets, with additional
exposure due to off-balance sheet financing of their customers.”
24
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banking sector at the time. 30 Plus, the repo market had doubled in size between
2002 and 2007. 31
How does a repo “deposit” work? The repo depositor sends the repo
borrower (the Wall Street bank) its cash on three conditions: (1) the deposit
will be secured by collateral (i.e., securities valued at above the amount of the
cash deposit) 32; (2) the bank will “repurchase” (“repo”) the collateral on a
specified future date, usually the next day, at the agreed-upon price 33 (the
difference between the repurchase price and the cash deposit is the “repo rate,”
or the interest that accrues to the lender 34); and (3) if the bank defaults on its
obligation to repurchase the collateral, the repo lender will have automatic
recourse to the collateral, which it can immediately liquidate. 35
If the repo agreement is an overnight transaction (as usually is the case),
then the repo depositor has a choice each day: either “roll over” its repo (i.e.,
not withdraw and collect another day’s worth of interest) or not roll over its
repo (i.e., withdraw its funds from the bank). If the repo lender chooses to not
roll over its repo, the bank has two options: either repurchase the collateral (as
it is contractually obliged to do under the repo agreement) or, if lacking the
liquidity to repurchase the securities, walk away from the deal and leave the
collateral with the repo lender. 36
The question becomes: is automatic recourse to the collateral enough of a
security interest to forestall bank runs by skittish repo lenders? Given the
30

See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 43–44.
See Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 278, referring to data
compiled by BIS economists Peter Hordahl and Michael King.
32
See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 22: “The cash advanced in a repo is less than the value
of the collateral. The purpose of this over-collateralization, or “haircut,” is to protect the cash lender if the
borrower defaults and the lender must liquidate the collateral . . . typical haircuts . . . ranged from about 1% for
Treasury securities to 12% for high-yield convertible bonds.”
33
See Gorton and Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” at 9.
34
See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers, at 23: “Because repos are safe for cash lenders, the interest
rates are low. During the Summer of 2008, overnight repo rates were close to the target federal funds rate of
2%.”
35
Repurchase agreements are exempt from the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code. If a party to a
repo agreement files for bankruptcy, the non-defaulting party can unilaterally enforce the termination
provisions of the repo agreement, rather than having to become a debtor in the defaulting party’s bankruptcy
case. See American Home Mortgage Corp. v. Lehman Brothers (2008), upholding the automatic stay safe
harbor for repurchase agreements. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 23: “If a cash barrower
defaults on a repo, the lender can liquidate the collateral immediately.” See also Gorton and Metrick,
“Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 284, pointing out that “This safe harbor has real value to market
participants.”
36
See Paolo Saguato, The liquidity dilemma and the repo market: A two-step policy option to address
the regulatory void 5 (London Schl. Of Econ. Law, Society, and Econ. Woring Paper 21, 2015).
31
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panicky behavior of repo lenders in the lead-up to the Great Recession, the
answer seems to be no.
E. The Run on Repo
In the summer of 2007, US housing prices began to slow at the same time
subprime mortgage defaults began to pick up in pace. Wall Street banks, on the
asset sides of their balance sheets, were heavily exposed to these ailing
markets. Repo creditors became anxious about the fundamental health of their
repo borrower counterparties. As Gorton recounts,
When news of [the housing and mortgage] shock arrived, bank
creditors went to monitor the banks: Did they have the money? The
run was a demand for cash, and repo agreements were not renewed
. . . To meet cash demands 37, [banks] had to sell assets, causing the
prices of all assets to go down…they became hard to sell to raise
sufficient cash, so the Federal Reserve stepped in to buy assets. The
crisis was magnified when Lehman Brothers was not bailed out. In
the end, a number of major financial firms disappeared: Bear Stearns,
Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual,
and Countrywide. The economy became moribund. 38

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reported that, in the acute phase
of the financial crisis, of the thirteen “most important financial institutions in
the United States, twelve were at risk of failure within a period of a week or
two.” 39 The Great Recession was a systemic event, and it is important to
realize that it began with a financial panic—a run on short-term money market
instruments, predominantly overnight repo. The developments in the US
housing and mortgage markets were not the main culprit. 40 In Bernanke’s
view, these developments were mere “triggering events that interacted with
deeper vulnerabilities in the financial system.” 41 In line with Gorton and Ricks,
37
See Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Oncu, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: the Repo Market (New York Univ. Stern Schl. of
Business, Regulating Wall St) w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/97/the-doddfrank-wall-streetreo.html: “With the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the repo market . . . came to a near halt and
settlement fails of [banks] skyrocketed.”
38
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 182–83.
39
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION at 354 (Jan. 2011)
40
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47. “Subprime mortgage originations in 2005 and
2006 totaled about $1.2 trillion, a large number to be sure, but not large enough to cause a systemic crisis.”
And at 115: “House price declines and foreclosures do not explain the panic.” See also GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 186: “The subprime shock was not large enough to account for the
crisis.”
41
See Ben S. Bernanke, “Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response,” remarks at the
Russell Sage Foundation and the Century Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance, New York, April 13,
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Bernanke believes “the Crisis [to be] best understood as a classic financial
panic.” 42 And “run on repos,” Gorton clarifies, “[was] the core problem.” 43
Consider for example the “sudden loss of repo financing” 44 and ensuing
collapse of the fifth-largest US investment bank, Bear Stearns. In March 2008,
Bear’s balance sheet had an asset side exposed to the housing market
and a liability side that was extremely fragile and exposed to runs. In
particular, Bear was rolling over each night in excess of $75 billion
of repo contracts on mortgage-backed securities . . . Bear’s primary
money market financiers…refused to roll over their repos. Bear had
to draw down on its $20 billion pool of liquidity, and within a week,
was brought to its knees . . . Bear faced bankruptcy by the middle of
March. 45

In September, the same series of events plagued the fourth-largest
investment bank, Lehman Brothers. In his paper “The Fed and Lehman
Brothers,” Johns Hopkins economist Laurence Ball details how “fears about
Lehman grew over the summer of 2008 as the firm suffered losses on its real
estate investments. Eventually Lehman experienced a run…a liquidity
crisis…[and] the most important problem involved Lehman’s repurchase
agreements.” 46
Once Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the repo panic fully engulfed Wall
Street. What followed was a “severe financing crunch” for consumers and

2012 www.russellsage.org/rethinking-finance. See also GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47:
“The shock was combined with asymmetric information about the locations and sizes of exposures to subprime
. . . it was not clear which firms had the largest exposures . . . the “depositors” were firms that deposited
money in the form of repo and received a bond as collateral . . . depositors did not know which banks were
more likely to fail . . . they just knew they were exposed to the risk that their bank would be insolvent. So they
“ran” . . . The run occurred in the repo market.”
42
See Gorton, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47: “The run on repo is . . . akin to previous
panics.” And at 58: “A banking panic is a systemic event because the banking system cannot honor
commitments and is insolvent. Banks . . . decided to sell assets . . . Asset prices plummeted. The banking
system became insolvent.”
43
See Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 279.
44
See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 25.
45
See Acharya, “The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition
Risks, and Lessons for India,” at 29. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 7: “Losses of repos
were disastrous for Bear’s and Lehman’s liquidity . . . On Friday September 12, Lehman had almost no cash,
and it was clear the firm would immediately default on obligations if it opened for business on Monday
September 15.”
46
See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 7; Id. at 103 (“Most of Lehman’s cash needs starting on
September 15 reflected repo agreements that were not going to roll: according to my estimates, lost repos
account for $66 billion out of a projected cash shortfall of $88 billion.” Also at 109: “Lost repos account for
75% of [Lehman’s] borrowing needs ($66 billion out of $88 billion).”).
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businesses in the United States. 47 Costs of financing skyrocketed while the
supply of available financing collapsed. Since overall economic activity is
heavily reliant on outside financing, the economic output of the United States
plummeted. Millions of Americans lost their jobs. The short-term debt panic,
concludes Ricks, was the “proximate cause of the severe recession,” the panicinduced financing crunch the “major driver.” 48
Ricks’ takeaway point—as is Gorton’s—is that “panics should be viewed
as the central problem for financial stability policy.” 49
F. Why did Repo Lenders Run?
If panics are “the problem” and forestalling them “the goal,” then
understanding why they occur in the first place is the necessary first analytical
step towards devising a panic-proofing solution. 50
Specifically, why did repo lenders—the all-important panickers of 2008—
refuse to roll over their repos? Remember that repos are fully secured loans.
Repo lenders have instant recourse to the collateral if their counterparty bank
defaults (even if the bank files for bankruptcy 51). Given the highly secured
nature of repo, “[Wall Street] firms theoretically should never lose repo
funding, because lenders [should] not fear losses from default.” 52 Why then did
repo lenders run? Ricks and Gorton offer fundamentally different explanations
for this.
Gorton believes that repo lenders panicked due to concerns over the value
of the collateral under their repo agreements. Since “repos are essentially
secured loans, counterparty risk [was] not an issue.” 53 Rather, it was
“uncertainty about the value of the collateral, should the counterparty fail,”
which led repo lenders to not roll over their repos. 54
Ricks, on the other hand, believes that repo lenders panicked not due to
collateral-value concerns but counterparty-viability concerns. He contends that
47

See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 121.
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 111, 121.
49
Id., at 122.
50
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 61 (“What should be the new regulations? The
answer to that question depends on what the problem is that resulted in a panic.”).
51
See 11 U.S. Code § 559.
52
See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 23.
53
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 133.
54
Id., at 54, 114 (“Confidence in the information insensitivity of repo collateral has been called into
question.”).
48
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“repo creditors do care about whether the [bank] will default” (whereas to
Gorton, that’s “not an issue”). It is worth quoting Ricks at some length here,
since this point is foundational to the panic-proofing proposal I make at the end
of the paper.
It is sometimes argued that secured money-claimants decline to
do fundamental analysis on their counterparties only because they
look to the collateral, not the counterparty, for protection. 55 This
view is mistaken.
This is a crucial point: secured money-claimants are not
indifferent between holding the money-claim and holding the
underlying collateral. They chose to hold the money-claim (instead
of an asset like the collateral) precisely because of its monetary
attributes; they chose to sacrifice yield for moneyness.
Even if the collateral can be seized immediately upon default, 56
the collateral lacks the moneyness property that was the very reason
for holding a money-claim in the first place. Repo creditors don’t
want the collateral. It’s all downside—collateral value in excess of
the repo face amount must be returned to the defaulting borrower—
and besides, it’s an operational hassle. Accordingly, repo creditors
and other secured money claimants do care about whether the [bank]
will default. 57

A 2010 investigatory report by a task force of repo market participants
corroborates Ricks’ point: “Repo depositors focus primarily, if not almost
exclusively, on counterparty concerns...even in the presence of high-quality
collateral.” 58 The Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission Report similarly found
that repo lenders in the Crisis were “reluctant to risk the hassle of seizing [and
liquidating] collateral, even good collateral, from a bankrupt borrower.” 59
In short, repo creditors just “don’t want the collateral. It’s all downside,” 60
irrespective of the collateral’s quality.

55
See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 23 (“A firm theoretically should never lose repo funding,
because lenders do not fear losses from default”).
56
Repo creditors are exempt from the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 559–560.
57
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 213–14.
58
Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Payments Risk Committee, Report, 19 (May 17, 2010),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/prc/files/report_100517.pdf.
59
See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 293 (Jan.
2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. An executive of State Street Bank was
quoted in that report as saying, “We don’t want to go through that uncomfortable process of having to liquidate
collateral.”
60
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 214.
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G. Looking Forward: What is the Lesson from the Run on Repo?
If recourse to repo collateral is “all downside,” then clearly repo as a
“secured” form of lending is not sufficiently secured to forestall panics by riskaverse repo lenders. Repo lenders need a heightened sense of security to “stick
it out” (i.e., to roll over their repos) when faced with counterparty-viability
concerns. How can we provide them with this increased sense of security?
More broadly, how can we panic-proof the financial system?
It is a critical question because a future panic remains a real possibility. In
2016, the Volcker Alliance, a financial policy think-tank chaired by former Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker and comprised of some of the world’s leading financial
minds, published an important pamphlet entitled “Unfinished Business:
Banking in the Shadows.” 61 Its main point is that an excessive reliance by Wall
Street banks on short-term debt (including a substantial amount of runnable
repo debt) remains the key unsolved problem for financial regulation today. 62
“Trillions of dollars of short-term debt,” they caution, “continue to roll over
regularly 63 . . . Despite the recent reforms, the financial system will remain
prone to funding runs.” 64
Former New York Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo has similarly warned that
“the levels of runnable funding . . . are [not] at safe or optimal levels, and the
conditions for destructive runs that threaten financial stability [still] exist.” 65
And Ben Bernanke himself has cautioned that “The risk of short-term funding
runs has not been eliminated.” 66
Evidently, the post-Crisis reforms did not panic-proof the financial system.
The two main pieces of financial reform legislation to emerge from the Great
Recession were the domestic law Dodd-Frank and the international accord

61
See Generally Unfinished Business: Banking in the Shadows, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE (2016),
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingI
nTheShadows.pdf.
62
“Put simply, uninsured short-term funding remains a threat to financial stability.” Unfinished
Business: Banking in the Shadows, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE 21 (2016), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/
default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf.
63
See BALKANOVA ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S. REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING MARKETS,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports NO. 740, at 13 (2015) (estimating in December 2015 that
“U.S. repo activity is split at $1.84 trillion in triparty and $1.58 trillion for bilateral repo”).
64
See THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE at 21.
65
See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Opening Remarks at the
Center for American Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference (July 2016), at 3–4,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160712a.pdf.
66
See BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT, at 574.
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Basel III, both passed in 2010. In the next section, I will analyze this
legislation with a panic-proofing comb.
II.

THE POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORMS: DODD-FRANK AND
BASEL III

A. The Risk-Constraint Approach to Financial Regulation
The post-Crisis banking regulatory framework follows a “risk constraint”
rather than “panic-proofing” approach to financial regulation. 67 To understand
the “risk constraint” approach, consider what then President Barack Obama
said in his major “Speech on Financial Reform” in 2009—in the heart of the
Recession: “The only way to avoid [another] crisis of this magnitude is to
ensure that [Wall Street firms] can’t take risks that threaten our entire financial
system, and [that] they have the resources to weather even the worst of
economic storms.” 68
To fend off another Great Recession, in Obama’s view, would mean
mandating “safer” balance sheets at the SIFIs. But this risk-constraint
approach, Ricks laments, is an “indirect strategy,” 69 a deliberate policy choice
to “leave run-prone funding structures intact while taking aim at the sorts of
things that trigger panics…various excesses that are supposedly endemic to
finance—excessive leverage, excessive risk taking, “overheating” markets, and
other “systemic” risks.”
And the risk-constraint approach can lead to misguided policy. Take for
example Basel II’s balance sheet treatment of AAA-rated insured mortgagebacked securities in the lead-up to the Great Recession. 70 Under the Basel II
core capital requirement of capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 8%, the top
20 US banks—heavily exposed to these securities—appeared exceedingly
“safe” in 2007 and 2008, averaging a ratio of 11.7%. 71
Because of their AAA ratings, these securities had a significantly
lower capital requirement under the Basel II arrangement . . . Credit
protection in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) purchased from
AAA-rated insurers on AAA-rated securities led to a 0% capital

67

See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 248.
See Barack Obama, “Speech on Financial Reform,” September 14, 2009.
69
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 249–50.
70
Basel II is the second of the international Basel accords, passed in 2004.
71
See Acharya, “The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition
Risks, and Lessons for India,” at 18.
68
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weight on these securities in the portfolio of banks’ balance sheets . .
. No wonder [Wall Street banks] loaded up on these asset-backed
securities . . . [their] balance sheets doubled from 2004 to 2007 with
only a minor increase in Basel-implied risk. 72

Under the risk-constraint approach, policymakers and financial regulators must
make judgment calls when predefining “risk” on a bank’s balance sheet. As
human beings, they will make mistakes. That they considered CDS-backed
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities “safe” in the lead-up to the Recession
should give us pause.
In sum, Dodd-Frank and Basel III are “risk-constraining” measures,
imposing heightened capital, leverage, and liquidity constraints—as well as
regular “stress tests”—on Wall Street firms in an effort to make them more
resilient in “even the worst of economic storms.” These are welcome changes,
but they “leave run-prone funding structures intact.” 73
B. The Post-Crisis Framework’s Treatment of the Runnable Repo Problem
Despite the run on repo playing a central role in precipitating the Great
Recession, Dodd-Frank and Basel III are “completely silent on how to reform
the repo market.” 74 In the 848 pages of Dodd-Frank, the phrase “repurchase
agreement” appears just 37 times (including 25 times in the “Definitions”
section). NYU economist Viral Acharya warns that “if [the repo] market is not
reformed, runs on repo will occur in the future, potentially leading to systemic
crises.”
1. Dodd-Frank §§ 210 and 1105: Maintaining Repo Depositors’
Propensity to Withdraw
There are two sections of Dodd-Frank that tangentially concern anxious
repo lenders: § 210 creating the Orderly Liquidation Authority and § 1105
discussing the possibility of government guarantee programs in future financial
crises. 75
72

Id.
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 249–50.
74
See Acharya and Sabri Oncu, “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: the Repo Market.” See also SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES, at 96 (“Lawmakers left an
important source of risk essentially untouched: banks’ reliance on very short-term repo financing.”).
75
There is also § 610, which modifies the existing lending limits law to include “repurchase
agreements” as a type of “loan and extension of credit . . . to a person outstanding at one time . . . [which] shall
not exceed 10 per centum of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus of the association.”
73
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In § 210, Dodd-Frank creates a receivership program for insolvent banks
called the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA). If OLA is activated, 76 the
FDIC, as receiver of the failed bank, “may disaffirm or repudiate any
contract”—including any repurchase agreement—it deems to be
“burdensome.” 77
If the FDIC finds a repo agreement to not be “burdensome,” then it may
honor the repo agreement (i.e., repurchase the collateral from the repo lender
pursuant to the repo agreement). But to do so, it would first have to pass two
high hurdles: (1) raise enough funds from the Treasury Department, despite
strict borrowing limits, 78 and (2) get explicit permission to honor the repo
agreement under the “terms and conditions the [Treasury] Secretary may
require.” 79 The FDIC has said that it would be “highly unlikely” for it to ever
honor a failed bank’s repo obligations in an OLA scenario. 80 Adding this all
up, the incentive of repo lenders to withdraw from their Wall Street
counterparties in times of uncertainty remains intact.
Turning to § 1105 on guarantee programs in future financial crises, DoddFrank makes it possible for the FDIC to create “a widely available program to
guarantee obligations of solvent [banks and bank holding companies] during
times of severe economic distress.” 81 The creation of such a program would
76
See Dodd-Frank § 203; See also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 257, explaining the “extraordinary
procedural hurdle” of activating OLA in the first place: “Bankruptcy is the default option, and activating OLA
requires the approval of not only the supermajorities of the boards of the FDIC and the Fed but also the
Treasury secretary in consultation with the president.”
77
See Dodd-Frank § 210(C)(1)
78
See Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(6). For the first 30 days of the FDIC’s receivership, the FDIC would be
unlikely to be able to borrow from the Treasury more than 10% of the bank’s most recently reported total
assets. See also § 210(n)(5), which requires congressional approval for the Treasury to issue Treasury
securities in order to raise OLA proceeds if issuing such securities would exceed the statutory debt ceiling.
79
See Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(5)
80
FDIC, Interim Final Rule, “Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” Federal Register 76, no. 16 (January 25, 2011), at 4212, the FDIC
writing, “A major driver of the financial crisis and the panic experienced by the market in 2008 was in part due
to an overreliance by many market participants on funding through short-term, secured transactions in the
repurchase market . . . In applying its powers under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC must exercise care in
valuing such collateral and will review the transaction to ensure it is not under-collateralized . . . if the creditor
is under-secured due to a decline in the value of such collateral, the unsecured portion of the claim will be paid
as a general creditor claim” and also that “most importantly, under no circumstances in a Dodd-Frank
liquidation will taxpayers ever be exposed to loss.”
81
See Dodd-Frank § 1105(c)(1). The Treasury Secretary “may request” that the FDIC and Federal
Reserve “determine whether a liquidity event exists that warrants use of the guarantee program” for solvent
institutions (1104(a)(1)). Dodd-Frank includes as a “liquidity event” “an exceptional and broad reduction in
the general ability of financial market participants . . . to borrow using financial assets as collateral without an
unusual and significant increase in margin” (1105(g)(3)). If the FDIC and Fed determine a “liquidity event”
exists, then the FDIC “shall create a widely available program to guarantee obligations of solvent insured
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require a joint resolution of Congress. 82 “Absent such approval, the [FDIC]
shall issue no such guarantees.” 83 Here again, the propensity of repo lenders to
withdraw from the banking system at the first sign of counterparty distress
remains intact, since to “rely on a mid-crisis act of Congress [to empower the
FDIC to honor repo obligations]…would seem to be a strategy fraught with
peril.” 84
In sum, we should take seriously Acharya’s warning that “runs on repo will
happen in the future.” Dodd-Frank does not take the requisite steps to prevent
them.
2. Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Commendable but not PanicProofing
Perhaps the most important post-Crisis change in US financial regulation
has been the adoption of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio of Basel III (the
“LCR”). 85 Under the LCR, the SIFIs must now hold enough “high quality
liquid assets” to meet 100% of net cash outflows in a hypothetical 30-day
“high-stress scenario.” 86 In promulgating the LCR, the OCC defined “net cash

depository institutions or solvent depository institution holding companies during times of severe economic
distress.” (1105(a)). The FDIC, “with the concurrence of the [Treasury] Secretary,” shall establish the “terms
and conditions” of such guaranty program (1105(b)(2)). “The Secretary (in consultation with the President)
shall determine the maximum amount . . . that the [FDIC] may guarantee.” The President then “may transmit
to Congress a written report of the plan,” and “absent [joint congressional] approval, the [FDIC] shall issue no
such guarantees” (1105(c)(2)).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 135
(2011).
85
Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,140 (October 10,
2014). The US rule is based on the new Basel liquidity standards. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (2013).
See also U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, 52 (2017),
confirming the Trump administration’s support for the LCR (but only for America’s global systemically
important financial institutions; “the [LCR] should be limited in application to only the largest banks”).
86
Basel III also established the Net Stable Funding Ratio (“NSFR”) requiring systemically important
banks to increase the amount of their “stable funding” (short-term debt not being considered “stable). The US
has not yet adopted this ratio and it appears unlikely that it will, at least in the Trump administration. In June
2017, U.S. Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin recommended delaying the implementation of the NSFR in
the U.S.; See also U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 13
(2017), “Treasury recommends delaying the domestic implementation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio . . . [it]
represents additional regulatory burden and would introduce potentially unnecessary capital and liquidity
requirements on top of existing capital and liquidity requirements.”
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outflows” as “reflecting aspects of historical stress events including…a partial
loss of secured, short-term financing.” 87
While the LCR is a commendable initiative, it is not a panic-proofing
solution. 88 It assumes that financial regulators can correctly specify in advance
the types of assets that can be easily liquidated in a panic. In a severe panic, no
assets (other than perhaps the highest-quality sovereign securities) are
guaranteed to sell at little or no discount. 89
Additionally, since the LCR treats certain illiquid securities and
systemically risky funding better than others for purposes of calculating the
ratio, it could “push banks towards regulatory arbitrage of the liquidity
weights” (thereby fostering excessive concentration into those better-treated
activities). 90 Do not forget Wall Street’s “safe” pre-Recession balance sheets,
loaded with “safe” CDS-backed AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities. 91 The
LCR could lead history into repeating itself. 92

87
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 19 (2014) (Overview of the
Final Rule).
88
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 251; See also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel
III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 15 (International Growth
Centre, Working Paper, 2011), https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Acharya-2011-WorkingPaper.pdf, “The introduction of the LCR . . . has merit.” See also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and
Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 22 (International
Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), “That liquidity risk is now at the forefront of Basel III . . . is clearly a
step forward.”
89
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 251. “How confident should we be in [the] capacity [of
regulators] . . . to specify in advance what sorts of assets can be easily liquidated in a panic?” See also Viral V.
Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and
Lessons for India 22 (International Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), surmising that government bonds,
“which would traditionally have been liquid and safe” could become “significantly credit-risky,” and asking
whether the “[Basel III] risk weights on government bonds are suitably calibrated.”
90
See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences,
Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 22 (International Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), “Without a
doubt, the implementation of the liquidity ratios will push banks towards regulatory arbitrage of the liquidity
weights, in particular, to the best-treated illiquid securities and systemically risky funding. Of course, the
unintended consequence will be a concentration into these activities. Regulators should be acutely aware of
this problem and be prepared ex ante to adapt in an expedited way.”
91
Id. at 28.
92
Id. at 36, warning about a “sudden eruption of sovereign credit risk” given the LCR’s push for firms
to hold more sovereign credit. The LCR “could constitute a significant systemic risk for the global economy in
the future.”
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III. PANIC-PROOFING APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL REGULATION
Hundreds of scholars have studied the Great Recession, yet Gary Gorton
and Morgan Ricks stand out for promulgating the “panic-proofing” approach
to financial regulation. Gorton and Ricks argue that panics are what cause
severe recessions and should thus be at the forefront of financial regulatory
focus. They accordingly bemoan America’s “risk-constraint” approach to
financial regulation, since it is an indirect approach that fails to pointedly
address the runnable short-term debt problem. They credit the Depression-era
advent of FDIC insurance for eliminating the recurrence of retail panics, and
implore policymakers to devise a panic-proofing scheme to forestall
institutional panics.
How can policymakers go about panic-proofing the financial system, one
that so heavily relies on short-term institutional money? Recall that a “panic”
is when short-term debt claimants decide en masse to no longer fund the
banking system.
Former Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo has alluded to a whole “menu of
possible responses” to the issue of runnable short-term debt at SIFIs. 93 One
extreme idea, for example, would be to simply restrict Wall Street banks from
relying on short-term debt at all. 94 That would solve the panic problem, since
there would be no potential panickers left. But, as Gorton importantly points
out, if “we want to provide a safe, deposit-like account for the bulk of repo
depositors” 95—who, as we know, “sacrifice yield for moneyness” 96—then we
need to instead “seek to preserve [this system] while making it much less
vulnerable to a run.” 97

93

See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS
261, 310 (2010) (cmt. by Daniel Tarullo).
94
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197 (discussing the possibility of
“squelching” systemically important banks from being able to finance themselves short). See also Daniel
Tarullo, Remarks at the Center for American Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference:
Exploring Shadow Banking: Can the Nation Avoid the Next Crisis? 5 (July 12, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160712a.pdf, discussing “outright prohibition” as
a possibility of a solution to the runnable short-term funding problem.
95
See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 261, 287 (2010).
96
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 213–14.
97
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197.
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY,
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A. The Gorton Plan: A Focus on High-Quality Repo Collateral
Gorton’s panic-proofing approach, unsurprisingly, is to “regulate repo.” 98
First, he would limit how much repo a systemically important nonbank (i.e., an
investment bank or other financial institution) could engage in. 99 Commercial
banks, able to access the discount window of the Federal Reserve for desperate
cash, would not be so limited in their repo exposure. Second, Gorton would
focus on strengthening the quality of the “the backing collateral” involved in
repo agreements.
This second point—on repo collateral quality—is the cornerstone of
Gorton’s panic-proofing proposal. Gorton’s system would be “aimed at
creating a sufficient amount of high-quality collateral that [could] be used
safely in repo transactions.” 100 Gorton would “place the government in an
oversight role in the securitization and repo markets [to] ensure that the safety
of the collateral for repo be overseen.” 101
Gorton’s baseline panic-proofing assumption is that, if repo collateral is
always of high quality (“namely ABS, treasuries, or agency bonds” 102), then
repo lenders will not run from their stressed Wall Street counterparties. 103
“Collateral for repo,” Gorton emphasizes, “must have [the] property [of] . . .
demand deposits and AAA securities. What is needed [by repo lenders] is only
the general knowledge that [their] collateral is high grade.” 104
Ricks sharply disagrees with Gorton on this point, arguing that high-quality
collateral alone should not be expected to forestall repo runs: “Even if the
collateral is of the highest quality and can be seized immediately on default,
the collateral lacks the moneyness property that was the very reason for
holding the money-claim in the first place. Accordingly, receiving the
98

Id. at 198.
See supra note 27, “Repos outside of banks would be constrained . . . .[they] could be offered by any
institution with a license and would be regulated so as to be more expensive than [repos offered by commercial
banks].”
100
Id. at 289.
101
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197–98. “The overarching goals of the
proposal are to bring securitization under the regulatory umbrella and to provide a system of collateral
production that can back repo without being so vulnerable to runs.” See also supra note 27, “Eligible collateral
for banks would be any bond that the regulators approve for their portfolios.”
102
Id., at 198.
103
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 85: “Gorton’s preferred policy solution involves strict
regulation of portfolio quality.” See also Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at
280, discussing the “imperfectly collateralized” repo that was at the heart of the financial crisis.
104
See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 181. See also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at
85, describing Gorton’s proposed repo policy as being “a “strict regulation of portfolio quality.”
99
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collateral is a distinctly unwelcome outcome for money-claimants.” 105 Ricks
does not even rule out a “run on fully secured Treasury repo.” 106
B. The Ricks Plan: Backstopping the Short-Term Debt of Systemic
Commercial Banks
Whereas Gorton would increase the federal government’s oversight and
standards for repo collateral quality, 107 Ricks would establish a federal
insurance program to backstop the short-term debt obligations of systemically
important commercial banks. 108 The Ricks proposal contains five main pillars.
First, only “licensed” SIFIs—the “member banks” in Ricks’ “licensed
money system” 109—would be permitted to access the short-term debt markets
at all. To receive a license and thereby earn the privilege of borrowing short,
banks would have to first meet a certain government-established “criteria of
admission.” 110 Market-making investment banks and commercial paper
conduits would be strictly ineligible for licenses and precluded from accessing
the short-term debt markets. 111
Second, the licensed SIFIs would be federally capped in terms of how
much short-term debt they could engage in. 112 There would be a “cap and trade
system,” with each member bank holding a permit entitling it to engage in a
certain nominal amount of short-term debt. 113 A “monetary authority” would

105

See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 89.
Id., at 214.
107
See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197, where Gorton concedes about deposit
insurance, “Let’s face it, the beneficial consequences of [deposit insurance] were probably the outcome of
luck.”
108
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 17.
109
See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 12–18, introducing his plan for a
“licensed money system.” At 13: “Licenses would be granted [by regulators] on an entity-by-entity basis.”
And at 17: “Only the licensed entities would be allowed to fund short.”
110
See Ricks, “Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis,” at 143.
111
See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 16: “Unlicensed entities would be
required to finance themselves in the long-term (capital) markets, not the short-term funding markets.” See
also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 17: “Entities other than member banks are prohibited from issuing
money claims . . . .This prohibition might initially seem radical . . . and would have major consequences for
the financial system as it exists today.”
112
See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 228.
113
Id., at 21. “The system’s aggregate permit capacity constitutes a cap on the quantity of broad money
outstanding. Permit capacity is tradable among member banks . . . no member bank is permitted to hold more
than some specified percentage of outstanding permit capacity, say 10%. . .the monetary authority establishes
the cap. It may adjust the cap in the conduct of monetary policy . . . Thus the size of the member banking
system is determined by the conduct of monetary policy.”
106
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establish the cap and be responsible for adjusting it periodically in the course
of its monetary policy.
Third—and the crux of Ricks’ proposal—a federal insurance program
would be established to backstop all the short-term debt obligations of the
licensed SIFIs. All the short-term debt obligations of “critically
undercapitalized” member banks would be “seamlessly honored” by the
federal government. 114 This would have the effect, in Ricks’ view, of fully
protecting money-claimants and eliminating destabilizing panics. 115
Fourth, to raise the funds for the insurance program, the member banks
would be charged risk-based fees. 116 These fees would be priced so that “each
member bank [would] incur the financing cost it would incur if it financed
itself entirely in the longer-term private capital markets.” To offset this
increased cost on the banking system, the member banks would bear none of
the cost of paying interest to their short-term creditors (“the government
[would] bear all of it”). 117
Finally, in order to reign in moral hazard at the banks—a natural
consequence of Ricks’ insurance program—“member banks [would be] subject
to portfolio restrictions and capital requirements,” 118 with “a supervisory
regime in charge of monitoring compliance with the constraints.”
C. Critiquing the Ricks Approach
I agree with the underlying ethos of the Ricks plan—of deposit insurance
being the right panic-proofing fix. Remember that the advent of deposit
insurance in 1934 led to the 75-year “Quiet Period” in American banking—but
that, overtime, as institutional “depositors” superseded retail depositors as Wall
Street’s principal source of funds, FDIC insurance became an anachronistic
solution to forestalling panics. Modernizing deposit insurance to account for
the institutional depositor—that is, to fend off the modern-day panic—seems a
logical course for financial policy to take.
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Id., at 227.
Id., at 202.
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Id., at 226.
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Id., at 203. “Accordingly, the determination of how much (if any) interest is to be paid on such
balances is a policy question, to be determined by the monetary authority. It is not a matter to be left to banks
and their account holders.”
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Id., at 225–26.
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However, is the Ricks plan asking too much? The support of Congress—
and let’s face it, the Banking Lobby—is a prerequisite to dramatically
overhauling the banking system. Ricks describes his plan as “conservative” but
also “radical”; in the end, it might just be politically impracticable.
The Ricks plan would be likely to face political backlash on the following
four points: (1) precluding the major nonbanks from accessing the short-term
debt markets, (2) capping the short-term debt exposure of the licensed
commercial banks, (3) federally insuring all the short-term debt obligations of
the member banks, and (4) imposing major risk-based fees.
Most contentious would be the third point. Cost-conscious and bailoutaverse policymakers would be unable to stomach the sheer scope of Ricks’
proposed insurance regime, which would guarantee all the short-term debt
obligations of the member banks (i.e., both secured and unsecured debt of oneyear-or-less maturity). It is not clear whether the risk-based fees would be able
to generate enough revenue to honor a potentially gargantuan amount of
insurance claims.
D. A New Idea: Federal Government as a Secured Repo Backstop
Given the realpolitik issues of the Ricks plan and the questionable
collateral-quality assumption driving the Gorton plan, I will offer a different
panic-proofing approach. My plan involves two key ideas: (1) providing
federal deposit insurance for the very-short-maturity repo obligations of the
SIFIs (while also ensuring the high quality of the collateral under those repo
agreements) and (2) limiting the access of the SIFIs to all other forms of
uninsured short-term debt.
1. Federal Government as Fully Secured Runnable Repo Backstop
The crux of my panic-proofing proposal is to establish a federal guarantee
program to backstop the SIFIs’ runnable repo obligations. There are three main
reasons why I believe this approach makes sense.
First, an en masse “run on repo” was arguably the leading driver of the
Great Recession, and it is therefore incumbent on policymakers to craft policy
that directly addresses the runnable repo problem.
Second, if we wish to make the repo market much less vulnerable to a run,
then it is critical that we provide repo lenders with a safe demand-deposit-like
account at Wall Street banks. Instant recourse to repo collateral (even high-
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quality collateral) is not enough of a security interest to forestall destabilizing
repo runs. Only by guaranteeing the moneyness of repo deposits can we
assuredly incentivize anxious repo lenders to roll over their repos.
Third, that repo is a form of fully secured lending makes repo insurance a
relatively safe governmental (and taxpayer) endeavor. Here’s how this system
would work: the federal government (perhaps the FDIC or Federal Reserve)
would be party to each repo agreement. In the event of a repo borrower default,
the government would simply step into the shoes of the defaulting SIFI and
repurchase the collateral from the repo lender at the agreed-upon price. The
government would then take title to the collateral.
There would be no naked bailouts. Nor would there be any need (as in the
Ricks plan) to charge risk-based fees on the banking system to support a
mammoth insurance regime. This is a crucial point: the federal government
would only ever make insurance payouts to repo creditors in exchange for the
high-quality collateral under each repo agreement.
This is where Gorton’s idea about collateral quality fits nicely into this
system. The federal government would be tasked with overseeing the quality
of the collateral under each insured repo agreement. By ensuring that repo
agreements contain only high-quality collateral, the government can reduce the
chance of repo panics in the first place (as is Gorton’s key panic-proofing
argument) while also augmenting the security of the repo backstop program.
Moral hazard at the SIFIs becomes an issue. If the federal government
agrees to backstop all of this runnable repo debt, won’t the SIFIs drive more
recklessly behind the wheel? This is where the risk-constraint approach of
Dodd-Frank and Basel III come back into focus. Implementing a federal
backstop for the SIFIs’ runnable repo obligations does not mean abandoning
federal oversight of the SIFIs’ balance sheets. Rather, the panic-proofing and
risk-constraint approaches can—and should—work in tandem.
2. Limiting the SIFIs’ Exposure to Runnable Short-Term Debt
The second step in my plan is to limit the exposure of SIFIs to runnable
short-term debt. For purposes of this system, runnable short-term debt can be
divided into two categories: (1) insured repo debt and (2) all other forms of
runnable debt (i.e., uninsured short-term debt).
With respect to insured repo debt, I would adopt Gorton’s idea:
commercial banks (with access to the Fed’s discount window) would not be
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limited in terms of how much repo debt they could take out. All the other SIFIs
would be limited in their repo debt exposure. The overseeing federal authority
would have to determine the appropriate repo-exposure levels for these
nonbank SIFIs.
More importantly, on uninsured runnable debt, all of the SIFIs would be
limited in their exposure, permitted to rely on only so much uninsured shortterm debt such that a run on that debt could only have a benign effect (i.e., not
be destabilizing to their balance sheets). Again, the overseeing regulatory
authority would be tasked with determining the appropriate exposure levels of
the SIFIs to this type of uninsured short-term debt.
In sum, this system envisions the SIFIs financing themselves with a
mixture of long-and-medium term debt, insured short-term repo debt, and only
an unthreatening amount of uninsured short-term debt.
CONCLUSION
I have tried in this paper to build upon the “panic-proofing” approach to
financial regulation, as championed by Yale economist Gary Gorton and
Vanderbilt law professor Morgan Ricks. Panics are the financial problem of
our time. If policymakers fail to adopt a panic-proofing attitude to financial
regulation, a repeat of 2008 seems to be not a matter of “if” but “when.”
I have proposed in this paper an original panic-proofing solution that is
focused primarily on the short-term repo debt market. I envision the federal
government becoming a fully secured repo backstop, guaranteeing to veryshort-term repo creditors the moneyness of their deposits at the SIFIs while
also limiting the SIFIs in their exposure to other forms of runnable short-term
debt. The government would be fully and safely secured by the high-quality
collateral under each insured repo agreement.
Creating another Quiet Period should be the goal of financial regulation.
History begs of us to respond to the runnable short-term debt problem. These
institutions are too big—too important—to fail. Panic-proofing—one way or
another—can recreate the quiet.
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